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Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education:
Scant Protection for the Student Body
Heather D. Redmond*
Introduction
In 1992, LaShonda Davis was a fifth-grader at Hubbard
Elementary School (Hubbard) in Monroe County, Georgia.1
During that school year, LaShonda was the victim of eight
separate instances of sexual harassment perpetrated against her
by G.F., a boy in several of her classes. 2 Those instances occurred,
on average, once every twenty-two days over a six-month period.3
After each instance of harassment, LaShonda informed a teacher
or her principal; however, she alleged that the school took no
disciplinary action against G.F. 4 In addition, LaShonda's mother
notified the school board of the situation after several of the sexual
J.D. expected 2001, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1998,
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank the editorial board and
staff for their technical assistance, and Matthew Biegert for his creative help and
support.
1. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir.
1997).
2. These events were alleged in a complaint filed on LaShonda's behalf by her
mother. See id. at 1394
3. See id. On one occasion, G.F. allegedly attempted to touch LaShonda's
breasts and genital area and made vulgar statements such as "I want to get in bed
with you" and "I want to feel your boobs." Id. at 1393. On another occasion, G.F.
placed a door stop in his pants and acted in a sexually suggestive manner toward
LaShonda during physical education class. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 634 (1999).
4. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 634. At one point, LaShonda's mother spoke with
LaShonda's classroom teacher, Diane Fort, and the school principal, Bill Query.
See id. She alleged that, during a conversation with Query in mid-May 1993,
Query only said, 'I guess I'll have to threaten him a little bit harder." Id.
According to the complaint, no effort was made by anyone at the school to separate
G.F. and LaShonda. See id. "On the contrary, notwithstanding LaShonda's
frequent complaints, only after more than three months of reported harassment
was she even permitted to change her classroom seat so that she was no longer
seated next to G.F." Id.
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harassment instances had occurred and the school failed to take
action.5
LaShonda's mother, Aurelia Davis, filed a claim against the
Monroe County Board of Education under Title IX of the
Education Act Amendments of 19726 (Title IX).7 The complaint
alleged that the harassment by G.F. against LaShonda had
"interfered with her ability to attend school and perform her
studies and activities," and that the school's "deliberate
indifference" created a hostile environment.8 The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed the suit
for failure to state a claim.9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed.10  The Eleventh Circuit then
granted the Board's motion for rehearing en banc" and affirmed
the district court's order dismissing Davis' Title IX claim against
the Board. 12 Davis appealed that decision and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
The Supreme Court held that a private damages action may
lie against a school board under Title IX in cases of student-on-
student harassment:
5. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 365 (M.D.
Ga. 1994).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901-07, 86 Stat. 373 (1972), as amended by 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1687 (1972). Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the
provision of educational services by federally-funded educational programs. See id.
Section 1681(a) provides that "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... § 1681(a). Under the statute a "program or activity" includes "all
of the operations of... a local educational agency ... or other school system." §
1687(2)(B).
7. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 634-38.
8. Id. at 638.
9. See Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 368. In reaching this conclusion, the court
reasoned that "[t]he sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part
of a school program or activity." Id. at 367. Additionally, the court addressed
Davis' argument that a Title IX cause of action could be based upon a school's
inaction upon allegations of sexual harassment between students when the inaction
was intended to discriminate against the child based on sex, stating simply that
"this court finds no basis for such a cause of action in Title IX or case law
interpreting it." Id.
10. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir.
1996).
11. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418, 1418 (11th Cir.
1996).
12. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir.
1997).
13. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 629 (1998).
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but only where the funding recipient 14 acts with
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in
its programs or activities. Moreover .... such an action
will lie only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the
victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit. 15
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis raises a number of
important issues. Davis established the basis for schools as third
parties to be held liable when a student sexually harasses another
student on school premises during school hours. 16  The
requirements, however, for third party Title IX claims under Davis
are extremely narrow, potentially acting as an effective bar to
almost every other similar claim in the future. The effects of
Davis on future court decisions and upon the schools themselves
will likely be great; however, it remains to be seen if Davis will
actually cause schools to change their sexual harassment policies.
This Comment supports the ultimate conclusion of the
Supreme Court in Davis, that schools should not be immune from
private claims for monetary damages under Title IX when a
student sexually harasses another student. This Comment,
however, argues that the standard drawn by the Court in Davis is
too narrow, causing the purpose of Title IX to go unfulfilled due to
such stringent requirements. This Comment concludes that Davis
will encourage, rather than discourage, irresponsible behavior by
school officials regarding student-on-student sexual harassment.
I. Background
A. Title IX Enacted to Solve Problems of Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment interferes with students' ability to access
14. For the purposes of Title IX a "funding recipient" is any educational
program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a) (1972). After a detailed discussion of the legislative history, text and
function of Title IX, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Title IX was enacted under
Congress' authority under the Spending Clause of Article I. See Davis, 120 F.3d at
1397. The Supreme Court later adopted this conclusion. See Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. at 640 (1999). "When Congress acts pursuant to its
spending power, it generates legislation 'much in the nature of a contract: in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."'
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
This explanation provides the foundation for the Court's conclusion that "a
recipient of federal funds may be liable in damages under Title IX only for its own
misconduct." Id.
15. Davis, 526 U.S. at 632.
16. See id. at 644.
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and take full advantage of their educational opportunities and
benefits.' 7 A student who is harassed at school may suffer a drop
in his or her grades,' 8 may refuse to attend a certain class, or in
severe cases, may refuse to attend school entirely. 9 The emotional
and psychological effects of harassment also have an impact on a
student's ability to learn.20
The statistics on peer sexual harassment 2' in America's
schools are alarming.22 In a 1993 survey conducted in seventy-
nine schools throughout the country, 85% of the girls and 76% of
17. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12034 (1997) [hereinafter OCR Title IX Guidelines].
This interference can manifest itself in many ways:
Sexual harassment... results in a loss of self-confidence and
disillusionment with male faculty and the educational system, in general.
It can produce doubts among women about their educational abilities,
leading to lower academic success and avoidance of certain courses,
majors, and careers .... Sexual harassment can also result in emotional
and physical illness.
Margaret L. Andersen, Sexual HarassmenL Purely Academic?, GENDER STUDIES
NEWS AND VIEWS (1996) (last visited March 16, 2000) <http://www.firstsearch.
oclc.org/FETCH:recno=l:resultset6:format=T:numrecs= 1:fcl=... /fstxt 11.ht>.
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 69 (D.N.H. 1997).
As a result of the harassment, the child in this case suffered a severe drop in her
grades. See id. She was also "deeply depressed, not eating well, not sleeping well,
crying frequently, spending time alone in her room, losing interest in sports, and
losing the ability to concentrate on her academics." See id. at 67.
19. See, e.g., Oona, R.S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1457-58
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the child suffered a severe drop in grades and was
eventually removed from the school to be home schooled, as a result of the
harassment); Doe v. Petaluma City Seh. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (N.D. Cal.
1993), nmdified, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that, as a result of the
severe emotional and mental distress the peer harassment caused, the student was
forced to transfer out of public school to attend private school).
20. See supra note 17.
21. Although defining what constitutes "sexual harassment" can be difficult,
some researchers have attempted to empirically define the term on a continuum,
ranging from gender harassment to sexual assault. See JOHN F. LEWIS & SUSAN C.
HASTINGS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION 22 (1994).
For example, one researcher defines sexual harassing behavior as (1)
gender harassment including "generalized sexist statements and behavior
that convey insulting, degrading, and/or sexist attitudes"; (2) seductive
behavior including "unwanted, inappropriate, and offensive physical or
verbal sexual advances"; (3) sexual bribery including "solicitation of sexual
activity or other sex-linked behavior by promise or reward"; (4) sexual
coercion includes "coercion or sexual activity or other sex-liked behavior by
threat of punishment'; and (5) sexual assault includes "assault and/or
rape."
Id. (citing MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 6 (1991)).
22. Peer harassment is the most frequent form of sexual harassment in school
settings. See JUDITH BERMAN BRANDENBURG, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
WHAT SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES CAN Do 7 (1997).
[Vol. 18:393396
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the boys surveyed reported experiencing unwanted sexual
advances that interfered with their lives.23  Most students
reported that they were sexually harassed for the first time
between grades six and nine.24
In response to these problems, Congress enacted Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).25 Title IX provides
that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ... "26 Although
the language of Title IX does not clearly define the statute's
purpose, its legislative history provides meaningful context. The
sponsor of Title IX, Senator Birch Bayh, stated that Title IX was
intended to:
provide for the women of America something that is rightfully
theirs-an equal chance to attend schools of their choice, to
develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills with the
knowledge that they will have a fair chance to secure the jobs
of their choice with equal pay for equal work. 27
This broad statement of Congressional purpose by the bill's
strongest advocate finds support in later acts of Congress. 28 In the
years since Title IX was originally enacted, Congress has explicitly
rejected some of the standards set out by Supreme Court decisions
that would limit Title IX's applicability.29 In doing so, Congress
23. See American Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found., Hostile Hallways: The
AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 7 (1993) [hereinafter
AAUW Survey].
24. See id.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972). According to the bill's sponsor, Senator Birch
Bayh, the purpose of Title IX was to provide "women with solid legal protection
from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate
second-class citizenship for American women." 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1972). Title IX carves out exceptions for some
educational decisions and certain educational institutions, see § 1681(a)(1)-(9);
however, none of those exceptions were at issue in Davis.
27. 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972).
28. For example, Congress approved the implementing regulations for Title IX
promulgated by the former Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
in 1975, holding recipients of federal funding responsible even when the acts were
committed by someone other than the recipient. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531-34 (1982). See generally Sex Discrimination Regulations"
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (detailing testimony which connects
Congressional intent in enacting Title IX with the broad provisions of the
regulations promulgated by HEW).
29. After the Supreme Court decided Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (holding that states are immune from liability under Title IX,
due to the Eleventh Amendment), Congress responded by enacting the Civil Rights
2000]
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has prevented the Supreme Court from interpreting the language
of Title IX in a way that may have rendered the statute ineffective
in dealing with the issue of sexual harassment in schools.
B. Harassment Defined as Discrimination
Courts first addressed the issue of sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination in the environment of the workplace. 30
Courts recognize two distinct forms of sexual harassment: "quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harassment.3 1 Quid pro
quo sexual harassment involves the conditioning of concrete
employment benefits on sexual favors.32 Hostile environment
sexual harassment is conduct that has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. 33 Although it was generally accepted that quid pro
quo harassment was a form of sex discrimination, in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,34 the Supreme Court clearly established
that a valid claim for hostile environment sexual harassment in
the workplace constituted sex discrimination. 35 Because a claim of
Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(7) (1986), which
abrogated the states' immunity. Similarly, shortly after the Supreme Court's
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (holding that
Title IX was limited to the particular program receiving federal funding), Congress
clarified that a "program or activity" under Title IX meant that the prohibition
against discrimination applies to the entire institution if any part receives federal
funds. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1987) (overruling
Bell).
30. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
31. See Michael Delikat & Lisa Swanson, Sexual Harassment Litigation: The
Changing Legal Landscape, 604 PRACTISING LAW INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. 7, 13
(1999), available in WL 604 PLIILit 7.
32. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 62. Usually a claim for quid pro quo harassment
requires a supervisory act of harassment "which culminate[s] in tangible and
adverse employment action." Delikat & Swanson, supra note 31, at 14.
33. MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARCKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (1991) (as defined by the EEOC). See also Vinson, 477 U.S.
at 62. "[Tjhe language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces
a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women' in employment." Id. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Vinson dealt with a claim for employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(1) to 2000(e)(17). See id. at 60.
35. The Court in Vinson explained:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
[Vol. 18:393
DAVIS V. MONROE CTY BD. OF EDUC.
discrimination based upon a hostile working environment requires
no showing of a tangible economic loss, the sexual harassment
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions...
and create an abusive working environment."'
36
In Title VII, Congress explicitly defined "employer" to include
any "agent" of an employer.3 7  Thus, when an employee's
supervisor or an executive of the company harasses an employee,
courts can use agency principles to impute liability to the employer
for the supervisor or executive's actions.
38
A different situation is presented when a co-worker or third
party acts in a hostile way toward an employee. Title VII speaks
only to liability for "employers"; thus, in order to bring a claim for
sexual harassment under Title VII, an employee must show that
the employer "knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action."
39
C. Title IX Protects Against Sexual Harassment in Schools
Sexual harassment is not an issue reserved solely for the
workplace. 40 In 1979 the Supreme Court ruled that individuals
can bring private suits against school districts based on violations
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
36. Id. at 67. The question of whether sexual harassment is sufficiently severe
and persistent to state a claim under Title VII is a question to be determined with
regard to the totality of circumstances. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; see, e.g.,
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that isolated
remarks or occasional episodes of harassment will not merit relief under Title VII);
Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that alleged instances of sexual harassment "must be more than episodic; they
must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.").
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
38. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72; see also Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159
F.3d 759, 767 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding employers presumptively liable for all acts of
harassment perpetrated by an employee's supervisor).
39. Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1998)). Accord Quinn,
159 F.3d at 766 (finding employer liable where it knows or should have known of
the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective
action). For the purposes of Title VII liability, an employer can be said to have
actual knowledge of the harassment if someone with authority to address the
problems is notified. See Sharp, 164 F.3d at 930. An employer has constructive
knowledge if, through the exercise of reasonable care it should have known what
was going on but failed to address it. See id. "If the harassment complained of is so
open and pervasive that the employer should have known of it, had it but opened
its corporate eyes, it is unreasonable not to have done so, and there is constructive
notice." Id.
40. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
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of Title IX. 41 In 1992, the Supreme Court expanded that ruling to
allow a student to recover damages, rather than solely injunctive
relief, under Title IX.42 Until very recently, however, there has
been no consistent standard under which courts have analyzed
Title IX claims when the denial of an educational opportunity does
not come from a direct mandate of the school district.43
In 1998, the Supreme Court finally provided some guidance
to lower courts as to the standard that must be used to evaluate
Title IX cases involving the sexual harassment of a student by a
teacher.44 In Gebser v. Lago Independent School District,45 a high
school student brought a claim under Title IX against the school
district after she and a teacher in her school had been discovered
having sex.46 At that time, the district had not distributed an
official grievance procedure or a formal sexual harassment policy
to the school. 47 The Court held that a student may not bring a
private action for damages under Title IX "unless an official who
at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination
and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has
actual knowledge of discrimination.., and fails to adequately
respond... [M]oreover ... the response must amount to deliberate
indifference to discrimination... "48
As in the cases of co-worker harassment, a different situation
is presented where one student harasses another student in the
41. See Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
42. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). "The general
rule... is that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal
courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute." Id. at 70-71.
43. Compare Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d
949 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a school liable for peer sexual harassment if the school
knew or should have known that the harassment was occurring) and Doe v. Oyster
River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding that constructive
knowledge of the harassment was sufficient to hold the school liable in peer sexual
harassment cases) with Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996) (holding that Title IX does not impose
liability for peer hostile environment sexual harassment, absent allegations that
the school district itself, through its own programs, directly discriminated based on
sex) and Piwonka v. Tidehaven Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(same).
44. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-90
(1998).
45. 524 U.S. at 274.
46. See id. at 284. In Gebser, the student did not report the relationship to
school officials; however, after they were discovered, the district terminated the
teacher's employment. See id.
47. See id. at 291.
48. Id. at 289.
[Vol. 18:393400
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context of the school. 49 Because Title IX protects students from
discrimination on the basis of sex only in the provision of
educational services by federally funded educational programs, 50 a
student plaintiff must show that the peer harassment amounted to
discrimination under a federal program.5 ' Until the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis, the courts of appeals throughout the
country, as well as a number of district courts,52 were split on the
issue of whether a student could maintain a cause of action under
Title IX against the school when the violating actor was another
student.53
Even those courts that agreed on the ultimate result of peer
harassment cases differed considerably in their reasoning. In
Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,54 the Fifth Circuit
found that a student cannot make a claim for student-on-student
49. Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999)
("The relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the
extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal
access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or
activity."), with Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57; Quinn, 159 F.3d at 759; Sharp v. City of
Houston, 164 F.3d ar 923 (explaining the differing standards used when a co-
worker rather than a supervisor is the harasser).
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
51. See Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. See, e.g., Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997)
(requiring that the school knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take
proper remedial action, showing an intent on the part of the school to create a
hostile environment for the plaintiff); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964
F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that a plaintiff may maintain an
action against the school district for peer harassment, but only where "the school
district knew or should have known [of the conduct] in the exercise of its duties"
and the school district failed to take steps reasonably calculated to end the
harassment); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 173
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting constructive notice as the proper standard and holding a
school district liable only where the school or school board had actual knowledge of
the conduct and failed to take action to remedy it); Wright v. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp 1412, 1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (requiring that the
schoool district had actual knowledge of the conduct and intentionally failed to take
appropriate remedial action because of the plaintiff's gender).
53. See, e.g., Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that, in the Ninth Circuit, it was clearly established that a school has an
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to remedy a known hostile environment
created by a peer); Doe, 138 F.3d at 661 (finding that a student may bring claim
against a school for peer sexual harassment); Davis, 120 F.3d 1390 (refusing to hold
schools liable for peer sexual harassment); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst.
& State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 960 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a school liable for peer
sexual harassment if the school knew or should have known that the harassment
was occurring); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that Title IX does not impose liability for peer hostile environment
sexual harassment, absent allegations that the school district itself directly
discriminated based on sex).
54. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
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sexual harassment, reasoning that a school must intentionally
discriminate against the student in order to be liable under Title
IX.55 Specifically, the court held that:
In the case of peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual
harassment claims differently based on sex. Thus, a
school district might violate Title IX if it treated sexual
harassment of boys more seriously than sexual
harassment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye
toward sexual harassment of girls while addressing
assaults that harmed boys. 56
Of all the courts to have addressed this issue, the decision of the
court in Rowinsky is by far the most generous to school districts.5 7
In Doe v. University of Illinois,58 the Seventh Circuit held
that a student could maintain a claim against a university for peer
hostile environment sexual harassment. 59 The court in Doe
rejected the reasoning of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which
had held that students could not bring such a claim when students
were not acting as agents of the school during the harassing
behavior.60 The court in Doe reasoned that the plaintiff was not
bringing a claim under principals of agency; rather, the claim was
based upon the school's "own actions and inaction in the face of its
knowledge that the harassment was occurring." 61
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,62 the
predecessor to the principal case, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, held that under Title IX, claims against the school board will
not be allowed when the claims are based on school officials'
failure to remedy a known hostile environment caused by the
55. Id. at 1016.
56. Id.
57. See Kathleen A. Sullivan & Perry A. Zirkel, Student to Student Sexual
Harassment" Which Tack Will the Supreme Court Take in a Sea of Analyses?, 132
ED. LAW REP. 609 (April 1999), available in 132 WELR 609.
58. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
59. See id. at 661.
60. See id. at 661-62 (citing the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006, and the Eleventh Circuit Court in Davis, 120 F.3d
1390).
61. Id. at 662. Simply stated, a school cannot be liable on agency principles
(respondeat superior) for the actions of its students, because the students are not
agents of the school. Instead, if a school is going to be liable for peer sexual
harassment, it must be based on some action or inaction of the school itself. Thus,
in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must allege that the
school denied an educational opportunity to the student by failing to respond
appropriately to remedy sexual harassment.
62. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
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sexual harassment of one student by another.63 First, the court
noted that Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending
Clause powers. 64 The court recited the rule that recipients who
accept federal monies also accept the conditions that Congress has
attached to the funds. 65 Under such circumstances, Congress
must give potential recipients unambiguous notice of the
conditions they are assuming when they accept federal funding.66
The court concluded that Title IX did not allow claims against a
school board for peer sexual harassment, because Congress did not
provide unambiguous notice that a school could be sued for failing
to remedy student-on-student sexual harassment when it enacted
Title IX.67
II. The Decision: Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education, in order to resolve a conflict "over
whether, and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal
educational funds can be liable in a private damages action arising
from student-on-student sexual harassment."68  In its decision,
issued May 24, 1999, the Court addressed the controversial issues
raised in peer sexual harassment cases, and in doing so carved out
a new claim for relief under Title IX.69 In addition, the Court
clarified the standard regarding peer hostile environment sexual
harassment claims70
In Davis, the Court held that a private damages action may
lie against a school board under Title IX in cases of student-on-
student sexual harassment.7 1 The standard for peer harassment
63. See id. at 1406.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Davis, 120 F.3d at 1397. "When
Congress conditions the receipt of federal funding upon a recipient's compliance
with federal statutory directives, Congress is acting pursuant to its spending
power." Id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99
(1983) (opinion of White, J.)).
65. See Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399; see also Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
1-3 (1981) (recipients of federal funding under the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act tied to obligations imposed under the Act).
66. See Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399.
67. See id. at 1406.
68. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638 (1999); See, e.g.,
supra notes 52-53.
69. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 632.
70. See infra note 72.
71. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 632. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the
en banc decision of the Eleventh Circuit dismissing Davis' claim. See id. at 634.
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claims under Title IX,72 however, was narrowly defined. 73 First, a
plaintiff must bring a claim against a recipient of federal
funding,74 and that claim must be based upon misconduct of the
recipient itself, not upon agency principles. 75 The Court dismissed
the argument of the Monroe County Board asserting that Title IX
failed to provide adequate notice to funding recipients informing
them that they could be liable for student-on-student sexual
harassment.76  The Court also disagreed with the Board's
contention that Davis sought to hold the Board liable for G.F.'s
actions instead of its own.77 The Court reasoned that in Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District, it had already specifically
rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to a school
district for the misconduct of its teachers.78 Instead, liability must
arise from "an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the
72. An action for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX may lie
only where: (1) the action is against a recipient of federal funding and based upon
the actions of the recipient itself (2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of
the harassment; (3) the funding recipient acted with deliberate indifference; and (4)
the harassment was so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively
barred access to an educational opportunity or benefit. See id. at 632.
73. In fact, the standard for peer harassment cases in the educational context
under Title IX was drawn even more narrowly than the standard for peer
harassment cases in the workplace under Title VII. An employer is liable where an
employee experiences sexual harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment." See MeNtor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d. 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). In addition, the plaintiff in
an employment case must show that the employer knew or should have known of
the conduct, and will prevail, unless the employer can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action. See Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929
(5th Cir. 1999).
74. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 632. In Davis, there was no dispute that the Monroe
County Bd. of Educ. was a recipient of federal education funding for Title IX
purposes. See id. at 640.
75. See id. at 642. The Court noted that Davis was not bringing a claim against
the Board under agency principles, but rather "attempt[ing] to hold the Board
liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student
harassment in its schools." Id.
76. See id. Specifically, the Board contended that Title IX only proscribed
misconduct by recipients of federal educational funds, not third parties. See id.
They argued that it would be contrary to the purpose of Spending Clause
legislation to impose liability on a funding recipient for the misconduct of third
parties, over whom recipients have little control. See id. See also Brief for
Respondents at 10, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No.
97-843) ('The definition of recipient does not include students. Nothing in the
language of Title IX would put a recipient on notice that by accepting federal funds,
it was opening itself up to unlimited liability for the actions of a student or third
party individuals.").
77. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.
78. See id. at 642 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
283 (1998)).
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violation."79 A standard set as high as "deliberate indifference to
known acts of sexual harassment"8 0 eliminated any risk that a
recipient would be liable in damages for actions of a third party.8 1
Moreover, the Court cited the regulatory scheme surrounding Title
IX82 as well as common law8 3 in support of its contention that
schools have been on notice for quite some time that they may be
liable for their failure to respond to discriminatory acts of certain
non-agents.8 4
Second, a plaintiff must show that the funding recipient had
actual knowledge of the sexual harassment by the plaintiffs
peer.8 5 Although in Davis, the Court did not lay out its reasoning
for this requirement, it did adopt this standard from the earlier
decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,8 6
where it reasoned that actual notice was required "to avoid
diverting education funding from beneficial uses where a recipient
who is unaware of discrimination in its programs is willing to
79. Id.
80. This is the third requirement that the Court established in peer sexual
harassment cases. See supra note 72 and infra note 88 and accompanying text.
81. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
82. The Court pointed to two regulatory schemes as proof that the schools had
notice of potential liability. First, the National School Boards Association, in
March 1993, issued a publication for use by schools, which observed that federal
funding recipients may be liable under Title IX for their failure to respond to
student-on-student sexual harassment. See id. at 646 (internal citation omitted).
Second, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) adopted policy
guidelines providing that student-on-student harassment falls within the scope of
Title IX's proscriptions. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646. (citing Department of
Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of
Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg.
12034, 12039-40 (1997) (hereinafter "OCR Title IX Guidelines")).
83. The common law has put schools on notice that they may be held liable
under state law for their failure to protect students from the tortious acts of third
parties. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644 (citing Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658, 666-67
(Fla. 1982); Brahatcek v. Millard Sch. Dist., 273 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Neb. 1979);
McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 320 P.2d 360, 362-63 (Wash. 1953)).
84. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.
85. See id. at 650. The Court expressly rejected the negligence standard, which
would hold the funding recipient liable for its failure to react to harassment that it
knew of or should have known of, noting that it had required actual knowledge for
cases of teacher-student sexual harassment as well. See id. at 640 (citing Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998)). The Court held that Davis
had alleged that the incidents of harassment had been reported; thus, she may be
able to show actual knowledge. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53.
86. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640-43. Notably, Davis does not address the issue of
who at the school must have actual knowledge of the harassment in order to impose
liability under Title IX. See, e.g., Canutillo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d
393, 398-400 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that a school was not liable for the sexual
molestation of a second-grade student by one of her teachers because the student
and her mother only reported the harassment to the girl's homeroom teacher).
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institute prompt corrective measures."8 7
Third, a plaintiff must show that the funding recipient was
deliberately indifferent to these known acts of harassment.8 8 The
Court explained that "deliberate indifference" was the correct
standard to hold the schools responsible for their own behavior.
8 9
"Deliberate indifference makes sense as a theory of liability under
Title IX only where the funding recipient has some control over the
alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its
indifference where it lacks the authority to take remedial action."90
Where the misconduct occurs during school hours and on school
grounds, the school has control over the students;91 thus, the
misconduct is taking place "under" an "operation" of the funding
recipient. 92 When a funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to
known acts of harassment against its students, and when the
harassment is taking place in an environment under the
recipient's control, then the recipient can be said to subject the
student to discrimination in violation of Title IX.93
Fourth, a plaintiff must show that the harassment was "so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or
benefits provided by the school."94  This standard is necessary
because, "in the school setting, students often engage in insults,
banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that
87. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283.
88. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. The Court clarified that this standard "does not
mean that recipients can avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable
peer harassment or that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary
action." Id. at 648. "On the contrary, the recipient must merely respond to known
peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable. This is not a mere
'reasonableness' standard." Id. at 648. In the Davis case specifically, the Court
held that dismissal was improper, because the complaint suggested the Board
"made no effort whatsoever either to investigate or to put an end to the
harassment." Id. at 653.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
92. See id. at 646 (citing Doe v. Univ. of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir.
1998)).
93. See id.
94. Id. At 652. "Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-
calling among school children, however, even where these comments target
differences in gender." Id. Still, it is not necessary to show physical exclusion from
an educational program, but only that the harassment "so undermines and detracts
from the victim's educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively
denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities." Id. Cf.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (using a similar standard
for determining when harassment in the employment context is actionable as
discrimination).
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is upsetting to the students subjected to it." 95 The Court saw this
standard as the appropriate way to "reconcile the general principle
that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known peer sexual
harassment with the practical realities of responding to student
behavior."96
III. Analysis
A. The Right Answer
The Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education correctly decided that a school district, as a recipient of
federal funding, may be liable for damages under Title IX for
discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual
harassment.97 Not only does the availability of a cause of action
against a school district for peer sexual harassment comport with
the purpose and text of Title IX, but it also makes sense in light of
the fact that schools should take responsibility for the well-being
of its students while the students are in school.
1. A Cause of Action for Peer Sexual Harassment
Comports with the Text and Purpose of Title IX.
Title IX was intended to "provide for the women of America
something that is rightfully theirs-an equal chance to attend the
schools of their choice, to develop the skills they want, and to
apply those skills with the knowledge that they will have a fair
chance to secure the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal
work."98  Title IX should be accorded "a sweep as broad as its
language" in order to give the statute "the scope its origins
dictate."99
Notably, the text of Title IX neither explicitly includes nor
excludes actions initiated by students against other students from
its coverage. 100 Instead, the language of Title IX focuses on the
95. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.
96. Id. at 653.
97. See id. at 638.
98. 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). According to Senator
Bayh, the purpose of Title IX was to provide "women with solid legal protection
from persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate second-
class citizenship for American women." 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh).
99. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
100. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (student seeking damages from school district under Title IX for
district's failure to prevent peer harassment). See generally 86 Stat. 373, as
20001
Law and Inequality
benefited class, persons discriminated against on the basis of
sex.101 Thus, it would seem that Congress was not concerned with
the identity of the perpetrator, but rather on a broader goal of
ensuring that all students, regardless of sex, are able to take full
advantage of their educational opportunities.
10 2
Allowing school boards to ignore acts of sexual harassment
against its students, no matter what the source, would reduce
Title IX to a proscription against quid pro quo sexual
harassment.103 Consequently, hostile environment claims would
be completely eradicated under Title IX, because intentional
discrimination could be accomplished by indirect means, and then
ignored by school officials. For example, Title IX would cover a
claim by a student that her school forbids women from joining the
baseball team. 10 4 However, if the same female was not explicitly
banned from joining the team, but instead was forced to quit the
team when the male players repeatedly sexually harassed her, the
school could turn a blind eye and face no Title IX liability.105 What
would be left of Title IX in that case is an extremely narrow and
amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-87; supra note 6 (quoting text of statute).
101. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
102. See supra note 98.
103. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
104. 45 C.F.R. § 86.4 states:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on
such basis.
(b) Separate teams .... [wihere a recipient operates or sponsors a team in
a particular sort for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such
team for members of the other sex.., members of the excluded sex must
be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a
contact sport. Id.
105. This student would be effectively barred from participating on the school
baseball team as if the school had explicitly mandated such a ban. If Title IX does
not mandate that a school take action to remedy this situation, an indirect ban on
the female student's access to an educational benefit would be allowed to exist
despite Title IX.
During oral arguments in Davis, the Supreme Court posed a similar hypothetical:
Suppose you had a-a baseball field and the rules of the school said, after
school there will be an hour for women-or the female students and an
hour for the male students .... But, in fact the boys decide they want
the-the field for 2 hours, and they're just not going to let the girls on.
And they do that over and over and over again, and the athletic director
knows about it but does nothing about it .... Is there a cause of action?
Official Transcript, United States Supreme Court, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) (No. 97-843) at 30. Mr. Plowden, the attorney for
Monroe County Bd. of Educ. responded, "I still would not agree that that's a
violation of Title IX." Id. at 30-3 1.
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easily circumvented protection for students against overt
discrimination in school. This could hardly be said to fulfill the
broad purpose of Title IX.
The Court in Davis recognized this danger and decided to
hold schools responsible for failing to take action when faced with
evidence of sexual harassment of a student.106 "Where, as here,
the misconduct occurs during school hours and on school
grounds ... the misconduct is taking place 'under' an 'operation' of
the funding recipient" and therefore the school violates Title IX if
it fails to act.10 7
2. A Cause of Action for Peer Sexual Harassment Follows
Directly From Cases Holding Schools Accountable for the
Actions of Its Teachers.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,08 the
Supreme Court determined that a school board could be held liable
when a teacher sexually harasses a student. 10 9 Although the
Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs claim in that particular
case, it clearly approved a cause of action under Title IX for
teacher-student sexual harassment in limited circumstances.' 1 0
The Court's reasoning in Gebser can be directly applied to
cases of student-on-student sexual harassment. Gebser rejected
the idea that a school board could be held liable under agency
principles for the conduct of its teachers. 1 ' Thus, any argument
that teachers, and not students, are agents of a school for purposes
of Title IX is irrelevant in the sexual harassment context.1 2
The language of Title IX does not explicitly deal with teacher-
student sexual harassment any more than it deals with student-
106. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. at 644.
107. Id. at 630; see also Verna Williams, Running the Gauntlet No More: Using
Title IX to End Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment, 23 HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall
1996, (last visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/gauntlet.html>
("[S]chools must provide students with an atmosphere in which they can learn.
Allowing a sexually hostile environment is at odds with that duty.")
108. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
109. See id.
110. Id. The Supreme Court narrowed the cause of action by ruling that
"[d]amages may not be recovered.., unless an official of the school district who at
a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf
has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct."
Id. at 277.
111. See id. at 288-89 (permitting a damage recovery against a school for a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on agency principles would
frustrate the purposes of Title IX).
112. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999).
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student sexual harassment." 3 Since Title IX liability is based
solely upon the action or inaction of the school,114 the Court in
Davis appropriately held that it is not relevant whether the
misconduct originated with a teacher or another student.115
3. Schools Have a Responsibility Toward Students While
They are in School.
Holding schools liable when they fail to address peer sexual
harassment is consistent with the notion that there is no one else
present during school hours to take steps to remedy misconduct by
students. 116 The casebooks are filled with stories of students and
parents caught up in a situation wherein a school refused to act on
evidence of serious sexual harassment by fellow students. 117
Davis is the perfect example of a case where, if the school
refused to remedy the sexual harassment of the student, the only
option left for the parents outside of filing a lawsuit was to remove
the student from the school. 118 LaShonda Davis endured six
months of persistent and severe sexual harassment by a boy in her
113. See Doe v. Univ. of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 665 (7th Cir. 1998).
114. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
115. Accord Doe, 138 F.3d at 665. The Davis court did find the identity of the
perpetrator relevant for a limited purpose. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. "The
relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to
which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to
educational benefits and to have a systematic effect on a program or activity." Id.
Thus, the identity of the harasser is only relevant in determining the degree of
harassment.
116. See supra notes 123-125.
117. See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (a
developmentally and physically disabled student was repeatedly sexually harassed
and assaulted on school grounds by another student-despite knowledge of
teachers and principle, no action was taken); Doe v. Univ. of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653
(7th Cir. 1998) (after repeated sexual harassment by a group of male students,
female student reported incidents-only action taken by school was to suggest that
the female student was herself to blame). See also LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note
21, at 24 ("Sexual harassment is prohibited under Title IX, yet sex-biased peer
interactions appear to be permitted in schools, if not always approved. Rather than
viewing sexual harassment as a serious misconduct, school authorities too often
treat it as a joke.") (quoting AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, How SCHOOLS
SHORTCHANGE GIRLS 73-74 (1992)).
118. See e.g., Oona, R.S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1457-58
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the parents had essentially been forced to remove the
child from the school to be home schooled, after the school failed to take
appropriate actions to remedy pervasive harassment); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch.
Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (N.D. Cal. 1993), modified on other grounds, 949 F.
Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that, as a result of severe emotional and
mental distress caused by peer harassment, over a substantial period of time, the
student was forced to transfer out of public school to attend private school).
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fifth grade class. 119 Despite repeated efforts by LaShonda and her
mother to notify the school and to remedy the situation,
LaShonda's teachers, principal and school board failed to take
action to protect LaShonda from her harasser. 120 As a result,
LaShonda's previously high grades dropped and she became
unable to concentrate on her studies. 12 1 Her father discovered that
she had written a suicide note, and at one point LaShonda told her
mother that she didn't know how much longer she could keep the
boy off of her. 122
It is at this point, if not much earlier, that a school needs to
be held accountable for its inaction in the face of sexual
harassment. During the time a student is at school, he or she is
under the sole control of the teachers and administrators of the
institution.123 Parents rely on school officials to both protect and
discipline their children. 124 It is well-recognized that during school
hours, the nature of the relationship between a student and the
school is akin to that of child and parent. 125 In this context, then,
there must be a means by which parents and children can seek
redress for damages caused by a school district's failure to remedy
sex discrimination. The Davis Court correctly held that Title IX is
that remedy.




123. State mandated school attendance, to some degree, gives rise to the
conclusion that teachers and administrators have control over the student while
the student is at school. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732
(8th Cir. 1993). This mandate, however, does not give rise to a constitutional duty
on the part of the state to protect a student, as it does a prison inmate or one who is
involuntarily institutionalized. See id. Still, courts have long held that students
have somewhat limited individual rights while at school, because of the special
need on the part of the school "to maintain an environment in which learning can
take place." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
124. See Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Parents
have long had a right to expect school officials to do what they reasonably can to
protect the children who are temporarily in their custody and to provide an
appropriate learning atmosphere.").
125. "[T]he nature of [the state's] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial
and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be
exercised over free adults." Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995). The Court has recognized the school officials' "comprehensive authority...,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
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B. The Wrong Standard
Although the ultimate conclusion of the Court in Davis was
correct, the standard is too narrow. 126 The standard is neither an
effective way to remedy the pervasive problem of sexual
harassment in our schools, nor is it an accurate reflection of the
purpose of Title IX. Moreover, the Court in Davis failed to explain
why the standard for bringing a claim under Title IX is so different
than the standard in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,127 despite similarities in the language of the
statutes.
1. Actual Knowledge
In Davis, the Court limited claims of peer sexual harassment
under Title IX to cases where the recipient of federal funding had
actual knowledge that the student was being harassed. 128 There
was no discussion in Davis of any other standard for knowledge;
the Court simply adopted its earlier holding in Gebser, that cases
of teacher-student sexual harassment require actual knowledge. 129
The actual notice standard is too narrow to deal with the
problem of sexual harassment in schools effectively. The
constructive notice standard is better.130 It would impose liability
126. A claim against a school in cases of student-on-student harassment may be
brought "only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment in its programs or activities .... [S]uch an action will lie
only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit." Davis,
526 U.S. at 631.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(a) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex .... or. (2)
to limit, segregate, or deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's ... sex ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1970).
128. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; accord Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d at 477
(requiring actual notice, because schools are liable only for their own
discriminatory conduct under Title IX); Doe v. Univ. of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 663
(7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that an actual notice requirement is the only way to
prove a manifestation of intentional sex discrimination on the part of the school);
Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist, 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997), amended, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 1360 (D.N.H. 1997) (deciding that the actual notice standard is necessary
to prove that the school intended to create a hostile environment for the plaintiff);
Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(reasoning that actual notice is clearly required under the language of Title IX).
129. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 631.
130. There is a third standard, strict liability, whereby a school would always be
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on a school when the school knew or should have known of the
sexual harassment. 131  Prior to Davis, some federal courts
regularly applied the constructive notice standard to cases of peer
sexual harassment under Title IX.132
Notably, the broader constructive notice standard is used in
the application of Title VII to cases of co-worker sexual
harassment in the workplace. l33 Under this standard, "if the
harassment complained of is so open and pervasive that the
employer should have known of it, had it but opened its corporate
eyes, it is unreasonable not to have done so, and there is
constructive notice."'34
The constructive notice standard should apply in cases of
peer sexual harassment in the schools. 135 A school should not be
allowed to escape liability simply because the child being harassed
has not expressly reported the conduct to the principal. That is
not to suggest that, in every circumstance, school officials should
be expected to know of every action that takes place within their
schools. 3 6 However, if sexual harassment in a classroom, hallway,
liable when a student sexually harasses another student. No court has seriously
considered using this standard in Title IX cases. In cases of supervisor sexual
harassment under Title VII, however, strict liability (under agency principles) is
applied. See Delikat & Swanson, supra note 31, at 17.
131. See Sullivan & Zirkel, supra note 57, at 611.
132. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997); Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.H. 1997);
Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Ky. 1996), affd on
other grounds, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.
Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
133. See Delikat & Swanson, supra note 31, at 27; see, e.g., Sharp v. City of
Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999).
134. Sharp, 164 F,3d at 930.
135. "[Sltudents are as much in need of, and indeed entitled to, a non-
discriminatory atmosphere in the classroom as are employees in the workplace. No
other result can be possible in light of the grave impact sexual harassment has on
its victims." Williams, supra note 107.
136. Instead, clear but flexible guidelines under a constructive notice standard
are possible:
For example, if a school knows of some incidents of harassment, there may
be situations where it will be charged with the notice of others--if the
known incidents should have triggered an investigation that would have
led to a discovery of the additional incidents. In other cases, the
pervasiveness of the harassment may be enough to conclude that the
school should have known of the hostile environment-if the harassment is
widespread, openly practiced, or well-known to students and staff.
OCR Title IX Guidelines, supra note 17, at 12042. Likewise, in the employment
context, "[kinowledge, actual or constructive, can be imputed to the employer from
first-hand observation, internal complaints, the pervasiveness of the harassment,
or the employer's indifference to sexual harassment, reflected by a failure to
establish a policy and a grievance mechanism to redress it." LEWIS & HASTINGS,
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or school bus, for example, is repeated and pervasive, then school
officials should be required to open their eyes and investigate. 137
Moreover, the Court's actual knowledge standard in Davis
assumes that those students who are being harassed, and thereby
denied educational opportunities, will always step forward and
report the incidents. This is simply not realistic.138  Adult
employees are not always expected to bring sexual harassment to
an employer's attention prior to bringing an action under Title
VII. l" 9 So why, then, do we require children to confront the adults
in their schools, even when pervasive and repeated harassment
already occurs in the presence of adults?
Davis also leaves open the question of who at the school must
have actual knowledge of the harassment in order to impose
liability under Title IX. If actual knowledge must be the standard,
then courts should require only that an agent or responsible
employee 140 of the school be informed of the harassment, rather
than only a principal or school board member.
Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija14' illustrates
the need for the broader knowledge requirement. In Canutillo, the
Fifth Circuit held that the school was not liable for the sexual
molestation of a second-grade student by one of her teachers
because the student and her mother only reported the harassment
to her homeroom teacher.142 Although Canutillo dealt with
teacher-student harassment, the same danger of non-reporting is
apparent in peer harassment cases. Many students and parents
will not always report the incident to the most powerful official at
the school, but instead are more likely to report harassment to
someone at the school with whom they feel comfortable, or who
supra note 21, at 14-15.
137. Sixty-six percent of students report being sexually harassed in hallways at
school, while 55% say the classroom is the most likely place to be harassed. See
AAUW Survey, supra note 23, at 13.
138. Research has indicated that victims of sexual harassment do not freely
report sexual harassment, nor are they encouraged to do so. See LEWIS &
HASTINGS, supra note 21, at 1. "Some victims use internal strategies, such as
enduring the behavior or blaming themselves. Self-blaming reduces the likelihood
of reporting." Andersen, supra note 17. Additionally, researchers have found that
girls are less likely to speak up and are more likely to tolerate harassment because
of repercussions and retaliation. See LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 21, at 25.
139. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
140. See OCR Title IX Guidelines, supra note 17, at 12042 (giving examples of
"responsible employees" as including a principal, campus security, bus driver,
teacher, affirmative action officer or office staff).
141. 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
142. See Canutillo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398-400 (5th Cir.
1996).
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has direct control over the classroom. 143
The actual knowledge standard is too strict to be effective in
the educational environment. A teacher or other school official
could, under this standard, ignore blatant sexual harassment
occurring within the classroom, unless the victim of the
misconduct officially notified the appropriate authority in the
school. 144  That result fails to provide students with equal
educational opportunities as promised in Title IX, especially
considering that the victims in these cases are schoolchildren, who
do not often report even the most severe harassment. 145 Moreover,
a child may not have the ability to identify the conduct as
harassment. 146 Thus, allowing the schools to ignore harassment
until actual notice has been given by the student to the
appropriate individual denies educational benefits to students on
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.
2. Deliberate Indifference
To bring a claim under Title IX, Davis requires students to
show that the school was deliberately indifferent to their claims of
sexual harassment. 147 Like the actual knowledge standard, the
deliberate indifference standard is too narrow to comport with the
broad purpose of Title IX.'14
All that a school district must show to avoid Title IX liability
is that its conduct, in the face of known claims of sexual
harassment, was not clearly unreasonable. 149 Again, the Court in
Davis failed to justify this standard, except to say that this
standard "is sufficiently flexible to account both for the level of
disciplinary authority available to the school and for the potential
liability arising from certain forms of disciplinary action."150 Aside
from its "flexibility" argument, every assertion that "clear
unreasonableness" is the correct standard is an attempt by the
143. See also Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). In
Murrell, the student and her mother repeatedly reported another student's
aggressive sexual conduct and sexual assault to the teachers, in order to remedy
the situation. See id. The principal of the school, however, was not informed until
approximately six weeks later. See id. Once informed, the school district neither
notified appropriate law enforcement officials nor disciplined the aggressor in any
way. See id.
144. See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398-400.
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. See LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 21, at 20.
147. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
148. See 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972), supra note 98 (explaining this purpose).
149. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
150. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
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Court to justify its conclusion to the dissenting justices, who fear
that schools could be held liable even when they take reasonable
steps to remedy a problem but fail. 151 Under what circumstance
will a district court judge determine that a school's response to a
claim of sexual harassment is enough to overcome the "clearly
unreasonable" standard?
There is no justifiable reason why the schools should not be
held to a plain reasonableness standard under Title IX. A
reasonableness standard would not even require a school to
remedy the harassment. 152 Teachers and school officials, who are
solely in charge and have custody of America's children for a great
part of every day, should at the very least be expected to act
reasonably. 153
Again, an analogy to Title VII cases is useful. In the
workplace, an employer is expected to show that, upon learning of
an alleged incident of sexual harassment, it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action. 154 This would be a much better
standard for school liability under Title IX. "Immediacy" is a term
that makes sense to reasonable people. "Appropriateness" is a
standard that can be determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. 155 Both of these terms can be more effectively
applied to the educational environment than can "deliberate
indifference." Nothing less than "immediate and appropriate"
action should be required of school officials upon learning of severe
and pervasive harassment of a student. Moreover, the immediate
and appropriate standard, which has the virtue of retaining a
school's flexibility to act, a significant concern of the Court in
Davis. 156
C. Consequences
The danger in drawing standards that are too easily met by
the schools, as the Court did in Davis, is that those standards will
151. "[T]he dissent erroneously imagines that victims of peer harassment now
have a Title IX right to make particular remedial demands." Id. At 648. 'The
dissent consistently mischaracterizes this standard to require funding recipients to
'remedy' peer harassment." Id.
152. A reasonableness standard, simply holding school officials liable for
negligence, would not punish reasonable acts that unfortunately had bad results.
153. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
154. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 1998).
155. Delikat & Swanson, supra note 31, at 35 (noting that "the duty to
investigate and take remedial action depends on the gravity of the allegations")
(citing Baskerville v. Culligan Inl Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995)).
156. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
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then encourage, rather than discourage, irresponsible behavior by
school officials regarding peer sexual harassment. If the
requirements of Title IX can be met with closed eyes and token
gestures, then there is nothing left to motivate schools to adopt
aggressive sexual harassment policies for dealing with peer
harassment.
The current guidelines set forth by the Department of
Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 5 7 are more comprehensive
than those in Davis. The OCR Title IX Guidelines require the
school to act if an agent or responsible employee of the school
knew, or should have known of the harassment through a
reasonably diligent inquiry.158 The OCR Title IX Guidelines also
require that a school takes immediate and appropriate action to
investigate and take steps reasonably calculated to end any
harassment. 159
It is unclear whether the OCR will make its guidelines more
lenient toward schools in response to Davis. Hopefully, because
the OCR does not have the ability to impose damages on a school
district for sexual harassment, 160 its guidelines will remain
justifiably strict against schools.
Conclusion
It is too early to tell what effect Davis will have on future
Title IX decisions.16 1
157. See OCR Title IX Guidelines, supra note 17. The OCR promulgated these
Guidelines to:
provide information intended to enable school employees and officials to
identify sexual harassment and to take steps to prevent its occurrence
[and] ... to inform educational institutions about the standards that
should be followed when investigating and resolving claims of sexual
harassment of students .... Overall the Guidance illustrates that in
addressing allegations of sexual harassment, the judgment and common
sense of teachers and school administrators are important elements of a
response that meets the requirements of Title IX.
Id.
158. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
159. See OCR Title IX Guidelines, supra note 17, at 12042. See also supra notes
155-157 and accompanying text.
160. Upon hearing and investigating a complaint against a school for a violation
of Title IX, the OCR will investigate and, if necessary, enter into an agreement
with the school to ensure its compliance. See OCR Title IX Guidelines, supra note
17, at 12040. "If the school has taken each of these steps, OCR will consider the
case against the school resolved." Id.
161. The two most recent cases relying on Davis give little assistance in this
regard, because it is likely that both cases would have been decided the same way
under a broader standard. In Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir.
1999), Murrell claimed that her mentally and physically disabled daughter had
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Although students now have an option to complain under
Title IX for peer sexual harassment, the facts in Davis suggest
that courts need only allow Title IX claims that present the most
severe and blatant disregard on the part of school officials. 16 2 The
Court correctly decided Davis; however, it also opened the door to
questionable behavior on the part of school officials that does not
rise to the level of indifference exemplified by the Davis facts.
Under Davis, schools have so much leeway in handling sexual
harassment claims 163 that Title IX's goal of securing equal
education for all students regardless of sex will likely remain
unfulfilled.
been sexually harassed by a male student on numerous occasions on school
property. See id. at 1243-44. Although the school had been notified many times of
the incidents, the principal refused to suspend the male perpetrator, but instead
suspended the victim. See id. at 1244. Applying the Davis standard to these
egregious facts, the court concluded that Murrell had presented a claim under Title
IX. See id. at 1247-48.
In Mosley v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 09-97-502CV, slip. op., 1999 WL
682697 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 1999), the student alleged a single act of harassment as
the basis for a Title IX claim. See id. at 1. The court affirmed the dismissal of the
action, because there was no allegation that the conduct had been sufficiently
severe to deny the
student access to educational opportunities. See id. at 2-3.
162. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 630-48. Notably, in the recent Murrell case, the
court interpreted the Davis standard to be even narrower than the standard itself
would imply. "That standard makes a school district liable only where it has made
a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination in its programs." Murrell, 186
F.3d at 1246. See also supra note 156.
163. See id.
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